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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the influence of background diversity of bank board members on 
performance and risk. Using data from Indonesian banks from 2001 to 2011 covering 4200 
individual year observations and 21 ethnic groups, we estimate the degree of diversity by 
considering various aspects (gender, citizenship, age, experience, tenure, ethnicity, 
nationality, education level and type) and find significant impacts on bank performance. 
On the whole, diversity is in general positively associated with performance except when it 
relates to ethnicity. It not only reduces performance per se but also increases risk. Female 
presence and professional diversity reduce risk but nationality and ethnicity diversities are 
associated with higher risk. Education diversity generally leads to higher income volatility 
and leverage risk. Our results are generally robust to various alternative performance 
measures, including risk adjusted returns, and estimation methods.  
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis triggered in 2008 has called for further investigation on existing 
governance practices and board effectiveness in the banking industry. The poor 
performance of many banks has often been related to poor governance practices and the 
failure of board directors to perform in the best interest of stakeholders (Aebi et al., 2012; 
Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Berger et al., 2012; Erkens et al., 2012). Other papers have 
questioned whether board structure actually matters for firm performance (e.g., Adams and 
Ferreira, 2007, 2009; Adams and Mehran, 2012; Anderson et al., 2011; Ferreira, 2010; 
Masulis et al., 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013). In this work, we look into various 
characteristics of board members such as gender, citizenship, age, experience, tenure, 
ethnicity, education level and type to investigate the impact of background diversity of 
board members on bank profitability and risk.     
It is widely accepted that banks' performance is closely related to various factors such 
as regulatory scrutiny, the degree of financial development and the existence of public 
safety nets such as deposit insurance systems. It is well understood that the banking 
industry is characterized by higher opacity and more complex agency conflicts than other 
industries (Levine, 2004; Morgan, 2002).  Also, because of deregulation and cross border 
expansion in most countries, banks have to deal with a more diverse environment to such 
an extent that it is virtually imperative for them to consider a more diverse board. As such, 
board structure and its diversity can be crucial and significantly related to performance 
(Anderson et al., 2011; Ferreira, 2010). Furthermore, board structure is an important 
governance mechanism particularly in developing and emerging countries where other 
control mechanisms are commonly weaker (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). Hence, when 
directors are regarded as important resources to the firm, various dimensions regarding 
their background and skills clearly become very important (Ferreira, 2010). 
Generally, board diversity refers to a situation in which members have different social, 
cultural and professional backgrounds1. The main purpose of diversity is to enhance the 
1 Cox (2001) define diversity as the variation of social and cultural identities among people existing together 
in a defined employment or market setting, social and cultural identity refers to the personal affiliation with 
groups that research has shown to have significant influence on peoples’ major life experiences. These 
affiliations include gender, race, national origin, religion, age cohort and work specialization, among others. 
The strains of literature typically distinguish heterogeneity or diversity into two types. First, the observable, 
the so-called demographic, heterogeneity, that can be described by gender, age, race, or ethnicity diversities. 
Second, the non-observables (cognitive) diversity includes education, values, perception and other 
personality characteristics (Milliken and Martins, 1996; Watson et al., 1998; Kilduff, et al., 2000; 
Timmerman, 2000). However, Erhardt (2003) suggest that most empirical literature on the diversity and firm 
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ability of firms to tap into diverse markets and to increase market share within a global 
economy (Cox, 2001). A more heterogeneous board offers benefits from diverse members’ 
skills and experiences which serve as complementary sources to access resources and 
connections (Davies et al., 2014; Ferreira, 2010).  
However, from another perspective, diversity can be regarded as endogenous to the 
firm characteristics and a way out when boards deal with agency problems. Increasing the 
level of heterogeneity, for instance, does not necessarily bring in more benefits because of 
a failure to harmonize different backgrounds and mitigate potential conflicts among board 
members that could ultimately lead to a negative net outcome (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009). Also, board heterogeneity might only be regarded as 
an effort to comply with certain regulations 2 , or to demonstrate an absence of 
discrimination and therefore its impact on organizational performance is unclear (Erhardt 
et al., 2003). Hence, we investigate whether board members' diversity actually affects 
banks' performance and risk-taking. We also question whether a specific type of diversity 
(gender, citizenship, age, experience, tenure, ethnicity, nationality, education level and 
type) matters more in explaining cross sectional performance differences and risk.   
This study extends the existing literature on bank board governance in several ways. 
First, a large number of works on governance practices in non-financial firms 3  find 
contrasting results and no clear-cut implication can therefore be drawn for the banking 
industry. Furthermore, the existing banking literature on emerging and developing 
countries has paid more attention to institutional, regulatory and macroeconomic 
determinants of bank performance (e.g., Berger et al., 2010; Caprio et al., 2007; Chen and 
Kao, 2011; Djankov et al., 2005; Macey and Maureen, 2003). Second, unlike other few 
studies on the banking industry (e.g., Adams and Mehran, 2012; Liang et al., 2013; Mateos 
performance focus on observable diversity. We interchangeably use “diversity” and “heterogeneity” to refer 
to the same definition. 
2 By 2008 in Norway, for instance, at least 40% females to be hold on boards of publicly traded and large 
firms. This requirement is also adopted by Spain and France (40% by 2015 and 2017 respectively), Italian 
(30% by 2015), and the Netherlands (30% for each gender by 2016). In Asia, female constitutes only 4.7% of 
the board members while it is 12.5% in UK (Davies, 2011, 2014). Other countries may adopt voluntary 
standard to promote gender balance on board. Despite that many firms have adopted diversity training 
aiming at to promote understanding and respecting cultural diversity and eliminate the roadblocks due to a 
cultural diversity, its effectiveness, however, remains questionable (Guiterrez et al., 2000).  
3
 For instance, Eklund et al. (2009) find a small and negative impact of gender on Swedish non-financial 
firms’ investment performance. In contrast, using data on Spanish non-financial firms Campbell and Vera 
(2007) find a positive effect of gender on performance. Zhang (2007) finds that tenure and experience 
heterogeneity of top management of non-financial listed firms in China is negatively related to performance.  
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de Cabo et al., 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013) 4, this paper considers not only a single 
measure of diversity (e.g. gender diversity), but also other diversity indices that could 
potentially influence performance (i.e. citizenship, age, experience, tenure, ethnicity, 
nationality, education level and type). Third, Adams et al. (2010) note that the vast 
majority of the literature on board characteristics mainly focuses on Anglo-American firms 
and hence studies of boards in non-Anglo-American firms is an understudied area. This is 
partly because only few firms from the latter provide information on board members to the 
public. But even when the information is available, previous works have mainly focused 
on a single dimension of diversity. For instance, in their work on US banks, Pathan and 
Faff (2013) investigate gender diversity but not the other dimensions. We go beyond by 
using several diversity dimensions, particularly ethnicity and professional background, by 
focusing on an emerging country. Our study provides evidence on how diversity of board 
members affects bank performance in a relatively weak shareholder protection 
environment as highlighted by Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013). To our knowledge, this 
study is the first comprehensive study looking into the impact of board diversity on bank 
risk. We consider the case of Indonesia which is the fourth populated country in the world 
(250 million) with more than 1,000 ethnic groups and 500 local languages, and with 121 
commercial banks including 10 foreign banks, making it an ideal laboratory to, 
furthermore, avoid cross country heterogeneity. In a country with weak investor protection 
rights, which is the case of this study, board structure and its diversity might have stronger 
effects in mitigating various incentive problems. This study also adds to the growing body 
of literature which investigates whether bank performance and risk during the global 
financial crisis of 2007/2008 can be partly explained by corporate governance mechanisms 
(Adams and Mehran, 2012; Aebi et al., 2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Berger et al., 2012; 
Erkens et al., 2012; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). Moreover, in Asia, the less transparent 
process of nominating and appointing directors and scarce board evaluation increase the 
probability of poor-performance directors to be re-elected (OECD, 2013). From this 
perspective, boards with a balanced diversity, and therefore presumably less prone to 
collusion of their members, are expected to more easily mitigate the lack of appropriate 
and sound external evaluation processes.  
4 Mateos de Cabo et al., (2012) and Pathan and Faff, (2013) only consider gender diversity as the diversity 
measure in European and US bank, respectively. Hagedorf and Keasey (2012), however, use several 
diversity measures to test its impact on market gains (i.e. cumulative abnormal returns) from US banks’ 
M&As. 
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Using 4200 individual year observations on the board of Indonesian bank including 21 
ethnicities within the 2001-2011 period, we construct indicators of diversity in four 
dimensions (i.e. gender, ethnicity and nationality, professional experience and tenure, and 
education level and type) and find such factors to affect bank performance and risk. 
Specifically, our results show that diversity in professional background and education 
positively impacts performance but that stronger heterogeneity in ethnicity and nationality 
is detrimental by leading to higher risk taking. The rest of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 shows how our work extends the current literature and provides a 
rationale for the tested hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and the econometric 
specification and section 4 the results.  Section 5 concludes.   
2. Related literature and research focus 
The board diversity literature is divided in various strands. The resource based theory 
argues that the board of directors (BOD) is a strategic resource by which a firm can get 
access to external sources such as funds, new skills or methods, and new opportunities. 
This theory is in line with human capital theory suggesting that every person has unique 
and useful characteristics. Hence, a heterogeneous board also allows more and richer 
information to flow into the firm which can benefit from a broader information network. A 
more diverse board is regarded as positive for the firm and its financial performance 
(Carter et al., 2010; Fang et al., 2012; van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). For non-financial 
firms, empirical studies have shown that heterogeneity is associated with positive 
outcomes such as more diverse perspective, higher creativity and innovation, and better 
results in terms of risk and/or audit management (e.g., Brown et al., 2002; Robinson and 
Dechant, 1997; Shrader et al., 1997). In the banking industry, however, studies using board 
size to capture a higher-resourced Board of Directors (BoD) provide inconclusive results 
(e.g., Adams and Mehran, 2012; Andres and Vallelado, 2008). 
Another large body of literature on board diversity is based on the principal-agency 
theory. Since the members of the board might have incentives to serve their own personal 
benefits and not those of shareholders, the board may need an independent oversight 
(Adams et al., 2010; Fama, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Also, to conduct effective 
monitoring and advising roles, boards accordingly need the appropriate mix of experience 
and capabilities that can be achieved through a more diverse board (e.g., Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003) in the notion that a more diverse board will increase board independence 
(Carter et al., 2010; Carter et al., 2003). In contrast, (Adams and Mehran, 2012) find that 
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board independence, which presumably is stronger as diversity increases, has no effect on 
bank performance. 
Carter et al. (2010) argue that as a homogeneous group is built in a search of trust, any 
new member from the outside or from a different background might be considered as a 
threat. The addition of new a member might generate extra costs and reduce team cohesion 
and performance. Similarly, diversity could bring unintended consequences such as the 
lack of cooperation, inadequate qualification, and conflict of interest (Ferreira, 2010).  
Nevertheless, contingency theory postulates that such diversity may still be desirable in 
some types of organizations and depending on specific circumstances at different times 
(Boyd, 1990; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004). In other words, when board heterogeneity 
results in better outcome (e.g. performance), it should be treated as imperative otherwise it 
should be reconsidered as unnecessary. For example, Pathan and Faff (2013) find that the 
excessive proportion of female on the board could adversely affect the possibility to catch 
more capable male directors. Such an effect is more pronounced for banks with low market 
power and smaller size.  
Other studies argue that higher diversity could lead to negative outcomes (e.g., 
Ferreira, 2010; Mueller, 2003). To achieve optimal performance, the board not only needs 
better access to relevant information that could be brought by outside members, but also a 
timely and efficient decision making process. Heterogeneous board may imply a trade-off 
between higher costs in terms of longer decision-making and the lower external costs 
associated with better information access (Mueller, 2003). Elron (1997) observes that 
cultural heterogeneity and member diversity do not correlate with group cohesion although 
the group cohesion is positively related to performance. This partly explains the fact that a 
heterogeneous board does not necessarily lead to better performance. In other words, while 
a more heterogeneous board might offer higher information efficiency it can hinder 
efficient decision-making. A heterogeneous board might also be superior in knowledge 
about the business environment and about other firms but does not necessarily come with 
superior knowledge about the firm itself. Other studies find that homogeneous teams 
outperform heterogeneous ones (e.g., Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009; Hambrick et al., 1996; 
Knight et al., 1999; Treichler, 1995)5. 
5  Hambrick et al., (1996) contends that diverse teams, based on educational, functional and tenure 
backgrounds, are found to be slower and less likely to respond competitors’ actions. Baranchuk and Dybvig 
(2009) suggest such teams lack cohesiveness that potentially affects the group effectiveness. 
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Similarly, previous studies find little evidence of any impact of gender heterogeneity 
on firm performance (see, e.g., Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Liang et al., 2013; Terjesen et al., 
2009; Terjesen and Singh, 2008).  
Other studies have investigated other types of diversities. For instance, Monks and 
Minow (2011) argue that the expertise and occupational characteristics affect the boards’ 
ability to effectively monitor and lead the firm. Looking into S&P 500 industrial firms, 
Anderson et al. (2004) find that independent director characteristics (i.e. executive, retired, 
and academic background ) is related to a lower cost of debt. Other researches also 
highlight that minority group members (e.g. ethnic minority) diverge in decision making 
(Westphal and Milton, 2000), and that their presence is positively associated with returns 
on assets and returns on equity (Erhardt et al., 2003), and Tobin’s Q (Carter et al., 2003).  
In the case of developing or emerging countries such issues can be further exacerbated 
by the lack of appropriate institutional environment and protection for shareholders. For 
instance, Khanna and Yafeh (2007) argue that the lack of transparency related to 
management structures often lead to worse corporate governance and expropriation of 
minority rights. Because ownership is often largely concentrated, the potential conflicts 
between majority and minority shareholders are generally more pronounced (e.g., 
Claessens and Fan, 2002; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; Djankov et al., 2008). For this 
reason, Saito and Dutra (2006) argue that minority shareholders and the firm itself suffer 
from a dependency problem between the controlling shareholder and the board of 
directors. Hence, the structure and composition of board structure in such countries is 
crucial and there is a need for an appropriate mix (i.e., diversity) of board members 
combined with other governance mechanisms (e.g., independent directors, presence of 
block holders, et cetera).   
There is much less research regarding the impact of board diversity on bank risk. 
Previous studies which are largely dedicated to non-financial firms suggest that women are 
more risk-averse than men and that their presence is associated with lower risk taking (e.g., 
(e.g., Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Mateos de Cabo et al., 2012). Adam and Ferreira 
(2004) argue that such a relationship might not be due to differences in gender risk 
aversion but, rather to a preference towards risk in homogenous environments –i.e. higher 
risk in a less diverse (fewer women) board. In contrast, Berger et al. (2012) provide 
evidence that a higher proportion of female executives in German banks leads to riskier 
activities. Another study by Harjoto et al. (2014), however, finds that industrial firms with 
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a more diverse board take less risk. Board diversity significantly curbs excessive risk 
taking for firms with above industry median risk taking activities. 
A study by May (1995) suggests that older directors are more reluctant to take risk 
because of the higher amount of their wealth vested in the firm while younger directors are 
more eager to undertake innovative high-growth investments. Similarly, Berger et al. 
(2012) and Grable et al. (2009) find that younger teams are associated with higher risk 
taking. Given that a board is commonly composed of persons with different ages and that 
different ages imply different working experience, the impact of experience and also that 
of tenure diversity on risk are still unclear. Previous studies also consider the relationship 
between education level and risk to be either positive (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Grable, 
2000) or negative (Graham and Harvey, 2001). Hence, how diversity could affect risk on 
this behalf remains an open question.  
 
2.1. The Indonesian institutional setting and bank corporate governance 
Like others countries in Asia, Indonesia has experienced an important economic 
growth until the 1997 financial crisis hit the region. The crisis called for the review of the 
existing corporate governance characteristics such as a very high degree of ownership 
concentration by family/business groups (e.g., Claessens et al. (2000) note that 71.5% of 
listed companies are owned by family/business groups), excessive government-led growth 
(Hanazaki and Liu, 2007), lack of transparency and control (Zhuang et al., 2000), and poor 
legal protection of investors (Obata, 2003). Regarding the Indonesian banking sector, 
studies reveal that there is over reliance on external (foreign) funding in the corporate 
sector that in turn leads to highly vulnerable positions and higher credit risks6. In addition, 
ineffective supervision by the two-tier board system and by creditors, as in Indonesia, has 
also contributed to the crisis (Asian Development Bank, 2000; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 
2013; Zhuang et al., 2000). In the post-crisis period (1997-2000), 61 banks were closed, 54 
taken-over, and 39 recapitalized.  
An explicit limited deposit guarantee (i.e. up to Rp20 millions per account of 
deposits) was introduced at the end of 1997 but this failed to prevent bank runs. In January 
1998, the government of Indonesia (GoI) introduced a blanket guarantee covering all 
commercial banks’ liability in all currency denominations which then was revised to cover 
6  On 14 August 1997, Bank Indonesia abolished the intervention bands (managed-float regime) on 
Indonesian rupiah and moved to free-float regime. At that time, the private sector hold US$78.1 billion of 
largerly unhedged offshore borrowing with the rupiah deeply depreciated, i.e. Rp4,650 (at the end of 1997) 
to Rp16,000 per US$ (in January 1998) (Batunanggar, 2002). 
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up to Rp5 billions in 2006, Rp1 billions in the beginning of 2007, and gradually reduced to 
Rp 2 billion in 2008. In 2008, the Indonesian banking sector experienced a big shock due 
to capital outflows following the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the U.S. leading to an 
important local currency depreciation, a large drop in the stock exchange index (>50%), 
and the activation of the Crisis Management Protocol (CMP).  
Regarding the corporate governance of banks, the central bank has proposed the so-
called Indonesia Banking Architecture in 2005 as the roadmap for the next 5-10 years 
where one of the six targets is the establishment of good corporate governance in order to 
strengthen the performance of banks. Accordingly, Bank Indonesia (BI) has introduced 
numerous regulations to promote good governance practices such as imposing a fit and 
proper test on bank board members, requiring a compliance director, and the introduction 
of independent board members (i.e., Bank Indonesia (BI), 2006). In the view of board 
diversity, however, there are only few regulations to address or encourage more diverse 
backgrounds of board members despite the fact that promoting diversity has proliferated 
particularly in the political context such as 30% gender representation.  
One particular regulation in the banking sector, for instance, stipulates that to hold the 
position of regional bank director a candidate should hold at least a bachelor degree (S1), a 
15-year experience in the financial institution, and should be at most 55 years old at the 
time of the appointment (Menteri Dalam Negeri, 1999). The regulation on fit and proper 
test for the candidate as stipulated by the regulation (PBI No.12/2010)  sets the general 
procedures and the targets of this test but does not specify detailed requirements for the 
candidate. Furthermore, it only suggests that the majority (more than 50%) of board 
members must have at least five years of banking experience. In relation to this, the current 
debate is on setting a minimum number of years of experience in the financial sector for 
board member candidates. 
3. Data, variables, and empirical setting 
3.1. Sample 
To perform our analysis, we use data from banks operating in Indonesia where there 
are 121 commercial banks and 1,682 rural banks (Bank Indonesia, 2011) serving more 
than 240 million people and more than 300 ethnic groups7. However, because data on 
boards’ profiles are rarely available our sample is limited to 38 commercial banks over the 
7 Cencus 2010 by Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), however, reveals there are 1.128 ethnic 
groups that inhabit throughout the country and speak in more than 200 different local languages. There are 
more than 10 ethnic groups with its population more than one million. 
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2001-2011 period. Our sample banks nevertheless represent approximately 82.6% of 
aggregate bank assets during the period under study with 418 bank-year observations 
covering approximately 4200 individual-year observations and more than 21 ethnic 
groups. This includes state-owned banks, private banks and regional banks. We exclude 
rural banks because such banks operate in a very limited area and are very small. Due to 
data availability, we only have two foreign banks in our sample.  
To construct our measures, we manually excerpt the profile of board members mainly 
from the annual reports, banks' web sites, and other relevant sources such as Indonesia 
Banking Institutes and news releases. Hence, when the first two sources do not provide 
sufficient information (e.g., the bank only provides the name and working experience), we 
go to the next sources until we find the necessary information. For banks which are 
subsidiaries or owned by business groups, we are able to collect more detailed profiles of 
board members in the affiliated firm’s reports/websites than in the bank’s report itself to 
complete the data. We also retrieve data from particular columns of banking magazines 
and newspapers that publish bankers’ profiles including information on their families and 
their life.  
 
3.2. Variables Measurement 
3.2.1. Measuring diversity 
Generally, existing studies measure board diversity (heterogeneity) using two 
approaches –individual versus composite indices. In this study, we identify seven 
individual measures namely gender, nationality, ethnicity, experience, tenure, education 
level, and education type. We focus on our composite diversity measures based on 
ethnicity and nationality (Ethnog), experience and tenure (Professional), and education 
level and type (Education) in addition to gender diversity. Nevertheless, for robustness, we 
also use individual measures which we discuss later. Individual and composite measures 
are defined as follows. 
To account for gender diversity, we calculate the proportion of women (Female) on the 
board as a proxy for gender diversity (see Appendix A for detailed definition).  Previous 
studies on diversity largely focus on gender as the main variable and show that stronger 
presence of women can either positively (e.g., Bilimoria, 2000; Erhardt et al., 2003; 
Mattis, 2000), negatively (Eklund et al., 2009), or non-significantly (Rose, 2007) impact 
on performance. Female directors commonly have higher expectations regarding their 
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responsibility leading to a better monitoring of managers by the board. Looking into 
European commercial banks, Quack and Hancké (1997) show that the proportion of 
women among managers decreases as the management level increases. Further they 
observe that while women accounted for half of the employees, only 16% of them seat on 
managerial positions. Based on a sample of 612 European banks, Mateos de Cabo et al. 
(2012) conclude that the proportion of women on the board increases in lower-risk, larger 
boards and growth-oriented banks. In another study, Bellucci et al. (2010) find that female 
business owners face tighter credit availability and that Italian female loan officers are 
more risk-averse as they tend to restrict credit availability to new borrowers.  
Studies on ethnic diversity have been less pronounced and virtually limited to certain 
countries due to ethnic characteristics in each country8. Cox (2001) examine the quality of 
ideas generated by homogeneous groups of Whites and other groups comprising Asian 
Americans, Blacks, White, and Hispanics. They conclude that ideas generated by 
ethnically diverse groups were rated on average 11% higher than those of homogeneous 
groups both in terms of feasibility and effectiveness. Nevertheless, Carter et al. (2010) do 
not find any relation between ethnic heterogeneity on the board and S&P 500 firms’ 
performances. We measure ethnic heterogeneity (Ethnic diversity) based on the ethnicity 
of bank directors (e.g., Chinesse, Javanesse, Sundanesse, Batak, Malay, Caucasian, 
Minahasa, Bugis, Minang et cetera). We note that there are more than 1,000 ethnic groups 
in Indonesia but we identify 21 ethnics that appear on the director profiles of this study. To 
compute ethnic diversity, we use the Blau’s index which is similar to inverse of the 
Herfindal-Hirschman index (HHI) and formulated as follows9: 
Diversity index = 1/ ∑ �Nα
NT
�2nα                 (1) 
where Nα represents the number of directors in the αth category and NT represents the total 
number of directors. A higher value taken by the index represents a more diverse group. 
8 Studies regarding the ethnicity might not be conducted in a country due to too homogeneous or because 
such data is not available for some reasons. In Spain, for example, ethnic diversity is not a big issue since 
White Spain constitutes around 98% of the Spanish population (Aja et al., 2000) in Campbell and Vera, 
2008). Another study by Simpson et al., (2010) only examines to what extent the ethnic diversity (i.e. 
Caucasian, African-American, Hispanic, and Asian) on S&P boards in 2007 with regard to their gender.   
9 We adopt Blau’s index of heterogeneity as Harrison and Klein (2007). This measures diversity as the 
degree of heterogeneity among board members with respect to a certain attribute for example gender or 
ethnicity. It is said to be an ideal measure of heterogeneity because it meets the four criteria that have been 
laid out for a good measure of diversity: it has a zero point to denote complete homogeneity, larger number 
indicate greater diversity, the index does not assume negative values, and the index is not unbounded 
(Harrison and Sin, 2006). 
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Following Fang et al. (2012), for example, ethnic diversity = 1/[Chinese ratio2 + Javanese 
ratio2 + Sundanese ratio2 +  Batak ratio2 + Malay ratio2 + Minang ratio2 + Javanese ratio2]. 
Globalization and deregulation in banking have broadened the access of banks to various 
resources including foreign board members. One can argue that foreign board members 
will not only provide broader networks but also, bring international perspective and 
experience to the recruiting banks. The bank could get advice on how the expansion to 
foreign markets should be established or how foreign banks operate in domestic markets. 
Liang et al. (2013) argue that foreign directors might bring new technology and managerial 
techniques, leading to better performance. In contrast, Masulis et al. (2012) find that 
foreign independent directors of the U.S. S&P-1500 firms is related to a higher 
compensation, lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance and poorer firm 
performance. To account for this effect, we use Blau’s index, based on the number persons 
who are foreign citizens and the others who are Indonesian. Each number is then divided 
by the total number of directors to compute the ratio of foreign directors (Foreign ratio) 
and the ratio of Indonesian directors (Indonesian ratio). Following Fang et al. (2012), 
Nationality diversity = 1/[Foreign ratio2 + Indonesian ratio2].  
To consider ethnicity and nationality diversity as discussed above we build a variable 
named Ethnog diversity defined as the average of two components:  Ethnic diversity and 
Nationality diversity. Hence Ethnog diversity = (Ethnic diversity + Nationality 
diversity)/2. 
The resource dependent approach and human capital theory suggest that education and 
training can improve the value of people allowing them to have better knowledge and 
skills to achieve organizational goals. Hence, education heterogeneity should broaden 
boards’ perspectives and improve decision making. Simons et al. (1999) find that both 
educational and cognitive diversity are positively correlated with organizational 
performance. In this study, following Anderson et al. (2011), we measure education 
heterogeneity based on depth (education levels) and breadth (education types). For depth, 
we use the Blau index (Education level diversity) based on the highest degree of directors - 
i.e., whether he/she has no bachelor degree (S0), bachelor degree (S1), master degree (S2), 
or doctoral degree/beyond (S3). We calculate the proportion of members in each 
educational level and measure the Blau index as formulated in Eq.(1). Specifically, 
education level diversity = 1/[S0 ratio2 + S1 ratio2 + S2 ratio2 +  S3 ratio2]. While for 
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breadth (Education type diversity), we divide the number of board members with 
education background other than economics, finance, accounting, and business by total 
board members. A higher figure indicates a more diverse board based on this background. 
To account for both diversities, we then measure education diversity as the average of 
education level and education type diversities.  
Tenure essentially represents the length of time (e.g. months, years) a person has been 
sitting on the board and can be related to the business experience of a director. Hence, a 
longer-tenured director should lead to better performance. An increase in board tenure, 
however, is not only related to greater commitment but also more inflated CEO salaries 
(Vafeas, 2003). Others argue that a longer tenure may reflect a greater influence of bank 
managers over directors’ opinions and decisions and bring an adverse impact to the firm 
(Anderson et al., 2004). In this study, tenure diversity (Tenure diversity) is measured by 
the standard deviation of tenure periods of board members. Next, working experience is 
important for directors to work effectively with other team members and to make better 
decisions. We measure the working experience by the length of time (years) a person has 
been working in the banking industry. This variable reflects the accumulated hand-on 
experiences gained from the banking industry leading to higher human capital that in turn 
should allow the bank to achieve better performance. To estimate experience diversity 
(Experience diversity), we use the standard deviation of the years of banking experience. 
We compute the average of Tenure diversity and Experience diversity and name it 
Professional diversity.  
3.2.2. Measuring performance and risk 
This study uses several proxies to measure bank performance. First, we introduce the 
return on assets (ROA) of the bank that is defined as profits before taxes divided by its 
average assets (the mean value of bank’s assets at time t and t-1). We also consider the 
return on equity (ROE) defined as the ratio of profits before taxes to the average equity 
(the mean value of outstanding equity at time t and t-1). Alternatively, we use two other 
measures of performance: (1) risk-adjusted return on assets (adjusted ROA) that is the ratio 
of ROA to its standard deviation calculated from the last three observations for the 
respective year; (2) risk-adjusted return on equity (adjusted ROE) that is the ratio of ROE 
to its standard deviation calculated from the last three observations for the respective year 
(i.e., t, t-1 and t-2). 
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In addition to the standard deviation of returns (SDROA and SDROE) to capture risk, 
we consider the Z-score (Goyeau and Tarazi, 1992; Lepetit et al., 2008; Barry et al., 2011). 
This score is defined as (ROA + EA) / SDROA, where ROA is the bank's return on assets, 
EA is the ratio of equity to total assets. We also split the Z-score into its two components 
Z-score 1 defined as ROA divided by SDROA and Z-score 2 which is EA divided by 
SDROA. Z-score 1 is expected to measure asset risk and Z-score 2 leverage risk. 
3.2.3.Control variables 
The size of the bank can be related to the bank's performance since a larger bank may 
be able to achieve cost reduction due to economies of scale. Hence, we consider  the 
logarithm of total assets (e.g., Berger et al., 2005) to control for this dimension (Size). As 
size increases, banks may enjoy better portfolio diversification benefits leading to a 
negative relationship with risk. On the other hand, by increasing its size, a bank could also 
benefit from To-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) safety net subsidies (De Nicolo, 2000). Following 
Pathan and Faff (2013), we also include the total capital ratio defined as banks’ total equity 
divided by its total assets (Capital).  A well-capitalized bank is less likely to default and 
hence its cost of funding might be lower possibly leading to higher profitability (Berger, 
1995). Banks with higher level of capital are able to sustain loss events more easily and 
hence avoid failure. Bank capital also determines the level of risk that banks might be 
willing to take. As such, this ratio is expected to capture the bank's degree of risk aversion. 
A bank listed on a stock exchange is expected to be more closely monitored and 
subject to stronger market discipline leading to better performance. Such a bank could also 
benefit from cheaper sources of funds. Following Liang et al. (2013), we include a dummy 
variable (Listed) that equals one (1) if the bank is listed and zero (0) otherwise. Publicly 
held banks should behave differently than their counterparts because they are subject to 
more stringent market discipline but at the same time they are able to raise additional 
equity at lower costs which allows them to invest in risky projects with higher returns. 
Hence, the effect of this variable is undetermined (Barry et al., 2011). We also use the loan 
to total assets ratio (Loan) to reflect the bank's strategy and its strong or weak focus on 
traditional intermediation activities (Lin and Zhang, 2009). On the one hand, banks with a 
lower loan to total assets ratio are less dependent on interest income and benefit more from 
diversification (DeYoung and Roland, 2001). On the other hand, because regulators allow 
banks to hold less capital against non-interest activities, financial leverage will be larger 
which may raise earning volatility further (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; DeYoung 
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and Roland, 2001). Banks with a higher share of loans in total assets can be more risky 
since they are more exposed to credit risk and therefore earning volatility (Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara, 2004). We further control for foreign ownership by considering a 
dummy variable (Foreign bank) which takes the value of 1 when foreign owners have 
stakes of at least 50% and zero otherwise (Barth et al., 2004). The presence of foreign 
owners could lead to lower cost of financial intermediation (i.e. lower spreads or margins) 
and thus lower profitability (Beck et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2001). Laeven (1999) 
argues that because foreign banks in South East Asia (i.e. Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand) operate under more restrictions, particularly compared to state 
banks, they take less risk. We also consider if the bank is a member (subsidiary) of a 
business group by introducing a dummy variable (Business group) which takes the value 
of 1 if a bank belongs to a group and zero otherwise). A bank operating in a business group 
might be more inclined to serve the interests of its group and affiliated firms. Claessens 
and Fan (2002) argue that firms in a business group often deal with greater management 
and agency problems, resulting in resource misallocation and poorer performance. On the 
other hand, such firms may be able to access funding at a lower cost. Claessens and Fan 
(2002) also highlight that a firm's risk strategy in East Asia is not only influenced by its 
own characteristics (e.g., size, capital etc.) but also by group characteristics; group 
structure can be used to diversify risks internally. Eventually, to account for the global 
financial crisis of 2007/2008 (Crisis) we introduce a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 for year 2008 and zero otherwise. As Asian banks were not immediately affected by 
the crisis we do not consider 2007 to be a critical year but we also include it for robustness 
considerations and find similar results.  
 
3.3. Empirical Model 
We consider the following specification : 
Performance or Risk i,t = α0 + β1Board Diversityi,t + ∑ βiControlsi,t +  εi,t      (2) 
where Performance represents bank performance measured by either ROA, ROE, risk-
adjusted ROA and risk-adjusted ROE. Risk is measured by either SDROA, SDROE, Z-
score, Z-score 1, and Z-score 2. Board Diversity stands for the four categories of bank 
board heterogeneity that we consider in this study (i.e. Gender, Ethnog, Education, and 
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Professional). Controls represents the matrix of control variables to account for bank 
characteristics and the financial crisis period.  
Pathan et al. (2008) argue that empirical studies on board composition and 
performance suffer from endogeneity issues that partly come from the nature of the 
variables used in such studies. Board structure in a given year, for example, could be 
affected by the bank's performance in previous years. Hence, in their studies, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003), Adams et al. (2010), Carter et al. (2010), Anderson et al. (2011), Fang et 
al. (2012) use an instrumental variables/two-stage least-squares (IV/2SLS) specification. 
For this reason, we use the instrumental variables (IV) approach to deal with potential 
endogeneity as indicated by our reported tests in the following section10.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Before we go further, we exclude the extreme observations (1% lowest and 1% 
highest values) to deal with possible outliers. We also drop negative values of capital as 
this implies that the bank is technically in default. Table 1 presents several descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in this study. Panel A describes the performance measures, 
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). The means of ROA and ROE during 
the 2001-2011 period are 2.2% and 18.5% respectively. Further examination reveals that 
both measures reach their lowest values in 2008 (ROE=14.3%) and 2009 (ROA=1.8%).We 
note that the average values of risk-adjusted ROA and risk-adjusted ROE are 5.4 and 5.1 
respectively. The means of SDROA and SDROE are 1% and 9% respectively whereas 
those of Z-score, Z-score 1, and Z-score 2 are 9.9, 5.2, and 3.9 respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
As aforementioned, we calculate diversity measures for each bank every year from 
2001 to 2011. We note (Table 2), on average, a considerable increase in professional 
diversity, followed by Ethnog diversity (i.e., the sum of ethnicity and nationality diversity). 
Education diversity increases until 2004-2005 and decreases to 1.13 in 2011. Female 
members, however, only constitute around 8% (2001) to 10% (2011) of board members.  
10 We utilize “xtivreg2” in Stata proposed by Schaffer (2010). It implements IV estimation of the fixed-
effects and first-differences panel data models with possibly endogenous regressors.  
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Panel B of Table 1 shows the bank board characteristics that are used to measure 
heterogeneity (diversity) of the board. To account for gender, we take the proportion of 
female (Female) on the bank's board. The mean of Female is close to 0.1 with a maximum 
value of 0.4 (or 40%). The maximum number of women serving on a board is five persons.  
As presented in the previous section, we calculate the composite index Ethnog 
diversity to represent the average index of diversity in ethnicity and nationality. The mean 
of this composite index is 2.2. Table 2 shows that Ethnog diversity continuously increases 
over the sample period, although slowly, suggesting that banks tend to appoint more 
persons from other ethnicities or foreign countries.  
Professional diversity measures the diversity in terms of working experience in the 
banking sector and tenure period acquired by the board member. A higher index indicates 
the richness of banking experience and hence could lead to a better decision making. 
Based on our results, it has the average of 5.9 years with minimum of 1.9 and maximum of 
9. We note that this variable also increase considerably during the period 2001-2011 
(Table 2). 
Education diversity, measured by the average value of diversity by education level 
and education type has a mean value of 1.2. Most of the board members hold a master or 
bachelor degree and almost every three of ten directors have a degree in fields other than 
economics or business.  
Panel C presents the descriptive statistics of the control variables considered in our 
study. On average, the total assets (Assets) of our sample banks amount to 40.1 trillion 
rupiahs. The ratio of equity to total assets (Capital) has a mean of 18.8% with a minimum 
value of 8.6% and a maximum value of 77.1%. Foreign ownership increases from 0.13 
(13.2%) in 2001 to 0.263 (26.3%) in 2011. Approximately 47% of the banks in our sample 
are listed on the stock exchange but only 29% in 2001 while more than 60% in 2011. More 
than half of the banks (around 58.9% of our observations) belong to a business group. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.2. Univariate Analysis 
Table 3 presents the pair-wise correlation matrix between the considered variables. 
The proportion of female on the board is negatively correlated with ROA, ROE adjusted 
ROA and adjusted ROE in line with the view that under certain circumstances the presence 
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of female –as an additional / tougher monitor- may lead to a negative net effect (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009). Similarly, Ethnog diversity negatively correlates with performance.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Professional diversity is negatively correlated with ROA and ROE but positively with 
risk-adjusted ROA and risk-adjusted ROE. Education diversity is positively correlated 
with performance except for ROA. In terms of risk, we find that Ethnog diversity is 
positively correlated with SDROA and SDROE whereas the other diversity measures are 
negatively correlated with both of them. Ethnog diversity is also negatively related to all 
Z-zcore measures whereas the other diversity measures are positively correlated with 
them. 
4.3. Multivariate Analysis 
In this section we run regressions of performance measures –ROA, ROE, adjusted 
ROA, and adjusted ROE- on the diversity measures and control variables. To deal with 
possible collinearity issues we introduce our main diversity variables one after the other in 
the regressions. Note also that the composite indices proposed in this study (see Section 
3.2) are expected to better deal with collinearity concerns. For instance, it might be argued 
that there is possible strong correlation between ethnic diversity and nationality diversity 
because an incoming foreign director mostly means that she/he belongs to a different 
ethnic group. Furthermore, a foreign member might bring longer banking experience 
increasing the professional diversity score. As a further robustness check, we alternatively 
use orthogonalized variables for the presumably correlated variables. We also examine 
regressions with individual diversity dimensions run separately.  
As discussed above, studies on board structure and performance often suffer from 
endogeneity that partly comes from the nature of the investigated variable. Such 
endogeneity, for instance, occurs because board structure may be affected by the bank’s 
previous performance or by other firm characteristics (Carter et al., 2010; Carter et al., 
2003; Fang et al., 2012; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Pathan, 2009). For instance, better 
performing banks are inclined to select more experienced board members. We check for 
endogeneity by running the Durbin Wu-Hausman Chi-sq test with the null hypotheses that 
the diversity variable is exogenous. The tests generally report that the diversity variables 
are endogenous except for model (1). Table 4 reports the results of IV/2SLS regressions 
with ROA, ROE, adjusted ROA, and adjusted ROE as the dependent variables.  
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[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Except for model 5 (ROE), our results show that almost all of the coefficients of 
gender diversity (Female) are not significant in our models. These results are in line with 
those of Terjesen and Singh (2008) and Rose (2007) who find that women have little 
impact when sitting on the board in contradiction with the findings of Erhardt et al. (2003). 
Despite the argument that a gender-diverse board is a tougher monitor, the net effect of 
gender heterogeneity (i.e. Female) is likely to disappear supporting the findings of Adams 
and Ferreira (2009) and Carter et al. (2010). This suggests that in the perspective of the 
contingency theory, such additional monitoring might be counterproductive. Also, there is 
a possibility that banks appoint female directors only to follow the trend of inclusion of 
women and ethnic minorities on the board.  Our sample allows us to examine diversity 
based on ethnicity and nationality of the board members (Ethnog diversity). Table 4 
reports negative coefficients of Ethnog diversity in all the models (ROA, ROE, adjusted 
ROA, and adjusted ROE). This is surprising because the board could presumably get more 
benefits from this diversity. This effect is economically significant. For instance, an 
increase of one standard deviation in this diversity measure is associated with decreases in 
ROA by1.1111, ROE by -0.52, adjusted ROA by -0.39, and adjusted ROE by -1.51. In 
other words, Ethnog diversity is not only related to lower performance, but also 
simultaneously to higher risk with a greater increase in risk, leading to lower risk-adjusted 
returns12. Our results are somewhat different from those of Carter et al. (2010) who finds 
no significant link between U.S. S&P 500 firms’ performance and the presence of ethnic 
minority directors and foreign directors. Furthermore, despite the fact that there are 
hundreds of types of ethnicities in Indonesia, bank boards are commonly dominated by 
persons belonging to a limited number of ethnic groups. Theoretically, ethnic 
heterogeneity on the board would allow them to better understand their customers and 
hence deliver better services. In practice, ethnicity diversity, if not well managed, may 
become a burden for board members because they often bring different values and norms 
that might be difficult to coordinate. Ethnic diversity might indicate diversity in other 
terms such as language, custom, behavior or even the specific perspective of certain ethnic 
11 To obtain this value, we calculate: ∆ROA = [one standard deviation of Ethnog diversity (Table 1) * the 
coefficient of this variable (Table 4)] / mean of ROA (Table 1). Hence, for ∆ROA =[0.937*-0.0265]/0.022 = 
-1.108. For ∆ROE=[0.937*-0.102]/0.185=-0.517, and so on. The economic significance of other variables 
are calculated with the same method. 
12 For example, we also regress a default risk measure, the Z-score and its two-components as in Barry et al., 
(2011) and find that Ethnog diversity is also related to lower Z-scores (higher default risk).  
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groups on conducting business activities. Working with persons belonging to different 
ethnic groups could pose challenges and not necessarily lead to better performance. 
Regarding the presence of foreign members on the board, although their involvement 
presumably brings a broader international exposure, a weak knowledge of local market 
characteristics might outweigh the expected benefits. Our results supports Masulis et al. 
(2012) who find that foreign directors often reduce the board's effectiveness leading to 
greater agency problems and poorer performance. 
Next, the coefficient of professional diversity is positive in all models, implying that 
an increase in professional diversity is likely to lead to higher performance. For instance, 
an increase in professional diversity by one standard deviation is associated to an increase 
of 0.55 and 0.21 times the current ROA and ROE respectively. Unlike Ethnog diversity, 
professional diversity is related to lower SDROA and SDROE. Hence, the effect of this 
type of diversity is economically more important when considering income volatility-
adjusted  performance as measured by risk-adjusted ROA and risk-adjusted ROE; an 
increase in professional diversity by one percent is associated with an increase in risk-
adjusted ROA of 1.37 and risk-adjusted ROE of 0.62 times the current levels. Note that 
professional diversity is composed by diversity in working experience in the banking 
sector and of tenure periods. Longer experience in the banking sector should lead to higher 
capability in managing a bank. Hence, in the perspective of the human capital theory, the 
presence of more experienced persons should lead to better decision making as supported 
by our results. Also, when we consider the second component (tenure period), a longer 
tenure may allow board members to learn from each other and exercise more skills. Our 
results support this argument.  
The importance of education and training has been advocated particularly by the 
proponents of the resource dependent and human capital theories. With regard to 
education, our results show that education diversity is positively related to performance. 
All of the impacts on performance are significant despite that education diversity is only 
associated with risk-adjusted performance measures at the 10 percent significance level. 
Economically, an increase in education diversity by one standard deviation is related to an 
increase of ROA, ROE, adjusted ROA, and adjusted ROE by 0.58, 1.19, 0.53, and 0.63 of 
the existing level respectively (see model 4 and model 8 of Table 4).  
Regarding control variables, we find Size to have little impact on ROA and ROE; it is 
only significant in model (1) and model (2). It nevertheless significantly and positively 
correlates with risk-adjusted ROA and risk-adjusted ROE. Highly capitalized banks are 
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likely to have a higher ROA and risk-adjusted ROA but a lower ROE. Such banks might 
be benefiting from lower funding costs. The coefficient of Loan is mostly negative for 
ROE in all models and for ROA in model (3). The coefficient is positive for risk-adjusted 
ROA.  
Foreign ownership has a negative impact on risk-adjusted ROA and risk-adjusted 
ROE and little impact on ROE and ROA. Ceteris paribus, being listed on the stock 
exchange is associated with higher risk-adjusted ROE and banks belonging to a business 
group generally exhibit higher performance possibly because they benefit from better 
funding opportunities and/or support from their group.  
With regard to risk, we find that the inclusion of a larger number of female members 
on the board is related to lower risk, particularly with regard to SDROA and SDROE (see 
Table 5). This is in line with previous studies (see, e.g., Barber and Odean, 2001; 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Mateos de Cabo et al., 2012). Economically, an increase 
in the ratio of female board members by one standard deviation reduces SDROA and 
SDROE by 71 and 14 percent respectively. In all models, Ethnog diversity is linked to 
higher return volatility (SDROA and SDROE) and higher default risk (Z-score, Z-score 1, 
and Z-score 2). For instance, an increase in Ethnog by one standard deviation is associated 
with approximately a 10 percent increase in SDROA and SDROE. Our results report that 
banks with professionally-diverse boards are likely to take less risk. Lastly, banks with 
more education diversity on the board exhibit higher returns variability, supporting 
Graham and Harvey (2001). 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Bank size (measured by total assets) is negatively related to risk, suggesting that the 
risk diversification hypothesis is more effective than the moral hazard hypothesis (TBTF). 
Banks with a higher proportion of loans in total assets are those with lower risk, supporting 
the conjecture that such banks might benefit from more stable earnings.   
 
4.4. Robustness checks: alternative measurements and models 
We go further by conducting tests to examine the consistency of our results with those 
obtained with a more extensive breakdown of board diversity measures. Specifically, we 
separately consider the impact of gender (Female), nationality (National diversity), 
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ethnicity (Ethnic diversity), experience (Experience diversity), tenure (Tenure diversity), 
education level (Education level diversity), and education type (Education type diversity) 
The results are reported in Table 6 and Table 7 for performance and risk respectively. On 
the whole our main results remain unchanged.   
[INSERT TABLE 6 and TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
To check for further robustness, we run regressions with alternative performance 
measures namely the net interest margin (NIM) defined as net interest income divided by 
average earning assets and the ratio of operating expenses to operating income (OEOI). 
These ratios are frequently used as alternative measures of bank performance. We report 
the results in Table 8.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
The coefficients of Female in both models show that the presence of women on the 
board is related to better performance –i.e. higher NIM but only at the ten percent 
significance level and lower OEOI in line with the argument of stronger monitoring. We 
do not find any significant impact of Ethnog diversity on NIM. Nevertheless, it has a 
positive impact on OEOI.  
Table 8 reports that professional diversity is associated with higher NIM and lower 
OEOI, confirming that such diversity is associated with better performance. Consistently, 
higher education diversity leads to higher NIM and lower OEOI. These results confirm the 
findings obtained in the previous section.   
In addition, we run regressions by excluding certain variables to deal with possible 
multicollinearity issues. First, we drop foreign bank from our models because it is 
considerably correlated with Ethnog diversity. This correlation is naturally understandable 
considering that banks owned by foreign investors are more likely to appoint foreign board 
members. Second, in our sample, around 60% of group-member banks are also listed on 
the stock exchange (the correlation coefficient between Listed and Business Group is equal 
to 0.36). Hence, we exclude Business group from the regressions. Next, we also exclude 
Listed because listed banks are more likely to be larger banks. On the whole our main 
results remain unchanged13. Alternatively, we orthogonalize Foreign bank, Business group 
and Listed with respect to Size. Again, our main findings remain the same. 
13 For brevity, we do not report all the results which are available on request. 
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5. Conclusion 
Board structure has received an increasing attention by researchers, regulators and 
practitioners. Specifically, the presence of board members with various characteristics 
(e.g., experience, tenure, education, gender, nationality, and ethnicity) is expected to affect 
performance through various channels. On the one hand board diversity is expected to 
enrich decision making process leading to better performance. On the other hand, diversity 
could become a burden to integrate and coordinate different views leading to poorer 
performance.  
We conduct our study in one of the most fast-growing yet very diverse country: 
Indonesia. We look into the board characteristics of 38 commercial banks in Indonesia that 
represent approximately 80% of the country's banking industry and cover the 2001-2011 
period. This allows us to consider approximately 4200 individual-year observations and 
more than 21 ethnic groups. The results, obtained from IV/2SLS models show that female 
presence does not strongly impact performance and that the presence of more diverse 
ethnic groups is associated with lower performance. Professional diversity that measures 
diversity in working experience and tenure periods is linked to higher performance. Lastly, 
education diversity has a positive and significant impact on performance.  
Furthermore, female presence has a negative impact on risk. Banks with diverse 
nationalities and ethnic groups on the board exhibit higher risk whereas those with higher 
professional diversity take less risk. Education diversity leads to higher income volatility 
and leverage risk. 
On the whole, our results show that looking into the diversity of board members is 
crucial for a better understanding of bank performance, supporting Claessens and Yurtoglu 
(2013) who argue that board composition is an important mechanism in emerging markets 
where corporate governance codes are relatively weak. The process of appointing board 
members should account for a higher degree of professional and education diversity as 
banks face more diverse environments. However, banks have to carefully mitigate the 
adverse impact of ethnic and nationality diversity. Our results suggest that to some extent 
the benefits of such diversity do not outweigh the adverse effects caused by the inability to 
integrate such differences and to mitigate potential conflicts among board members.   
On the whole, our findings suggest that the design and choice of board structure is 
critical in the Indonesian banking sector which is undergoing a notable improvement in 
corporate governance mechanisms as in other emerging countries. For example, regulators 
are aiming to set a minimum of ten-year experience for director candidates. Regulatory 
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bodies and stakeholders should also limit the possible downside effect while promoting 
more diverse boards. As argued by Ferreira (2010) firms should be able to identify the 
trade-offs of diversity in order to increase their performance and values. Therefore, 
drawing any firm conclusion on how board characteristics will eventually affect 
performance and risk is hazardous.  Nevertheless, our study sheds light on specific factors 
and possible tracks for future policies aimed at improving board effectiveness and 
efficiency.  
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 Table 1 Descriptive statistics of performance, risk and diversity measures 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A. Performance and risk measures
ROA 395 0.022 0.013 0.001 0.084
ROE 394 0.185 0.115 0.000 0.612
adjusted ROA 390 5.470 5.380 0.008 32.909
adjusted ROE 390 5.135 5.274 0.007 29.573
SDROA 405 0.010 0.017 0.001 0.168
SDROE 405 0.090 0.179 0.005 2.213
Z-score 406 9.924 10.875 0.161 70.626
Z-score1 405 5.293 5.366 -0.527 32.909
Z-score2 405 3.956 5.839 0.017 48.853
Panel B. Board characteristics
Female 414 0.094 0.100 0 0.4
Ethnog diversity 405 2.189 0.937 1 6.452
Professional diversity 393 5.942 1.453 1.938 9.313
Education diversity 395 1.220 0.386 0.556 4.010
Panel C. Control variables
Capital 400 0.188 0.090 0.086 0.771
Loan 416 0.567 0.178 0.010 0.932
Foreign bank 418 0.227 0.420 0 1
Listed 418 0.474 0.500 0 1
Business group 418 0.589 0.493 0 1
Assets 418 40100 72700 105.55 424000
Crisis 418 0.091 0.288 0 1
ROA is profits before taxes divided by average assets. ROE is profits before taxes divided by average equity. 
adjusted ROA (adjusted ROE) is the ratio of ROA (ROE) to its standard deviation calculated on last three 
year observation for the respective year. SDROA = the standard deviation of return on average assets based 
on three previous years data, SDROE = standard deviation of return on equity based on three previous years 
data, Z-score = (ROA+Equity-to-Assets)/SDROA, Z-score1=ROA divided by SDROA, Z-score2= Equity-to-
total assets divided by SDROA. Female is the percentage of female on the board. Ehtnog diversity is the 
average diversity index of ethnicity and nationality. Professional diversity is the average index of banking 
experience and tenure diversity. Education diversity is the average diversity index of education level and 
education type. Capital is the ratio of bank capital to its risk weighted assets.  Loan is the ratio of total loans 
to total assets. Foreign bank is a dummy equals one if the bank is owned by foreign shareholders, zero 
otherwise. Listed equals one if the bank is publicly listed, zero otherwise. Assets is the bank’s total assets (in 
billions Indonesia rupiah). Crisis denotes one for year 2008 and zero otherwise. 
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Table 2 Board Diversity from 2001 to 2011  
Year Female div. Ethnog div. Professional div. Education div. 
2001 0.085 1.881 5.532 1.122 
2002 0.084 2.086 5.599 1.312 
2003 0.094 2.197 5.782 1.325 
2004 0.083 2.200 5.763 1.334 
2005 0.081 2.173 5.833 1.286 
2006 0.093 2.206 5.804 1.250 
2007 0.100 2.287 5.843 1.193 
2008 0.104 2.220 6.060 1.150 
2009 0.107 2.285 6.276 1.180 
2010 0.107 2.246 6.303 1.148 
2011 0.098 2.253 6.379 1.136 
Total 0.094 2.189 5.942 1.220 
Table 2 reports the mean values of diversity measures. Female is the percentage of female on the board. 
Ehtnog diversity is the average diversity index of ethnicity and nationality. Professional diversity is the 
average index of banking experience and tenure diversity. Education diversity is the average diversity index 
of education level and education type. 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix 
No. Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 ROA 1
2 ROE 0.6156* 1
3 adjusted ROA 0.2757* 0.2324* 1
4 adjusted ROE 0.3068* 0.2500* 0.5788* 1
5 SDROA 0.3140* 0.0615 -0.6123* -0.3951* 1
6 SDROE 0.2275* 0.2717* -0.4059* -0.6085* 0.6492* 1
7 Z-score 0.0722 0.0764 0.6699* 0.6306* -0.6896* -0.7807* 1
8 Z-score1 0.0918* 0.3026* 0.7597* 0.5591* -0.7561* -0.5103* 0.8389* 1
9 Z-score2 -0.0809 -0.3433* 0.3373* 0.5161* -0.4473* -0.8946* 0.7756* 0.4341* 1
10 Female -0.1793* -0.2200* -0.0147 -0.1057* -0.1772* -0.1034* 0.0247 0.0132 0.0267 1
11 Ethnog diversity -0.0821 -0.0556 -0.1963* -0.2013* 0.1164* 0.1878* -0.1984* -0.1570* -0.1752* 0.005 1
12 Professional diversity -0.1705* -0.1901* 0.0453 0.0972* -0.1168* -0.2193* 0.1171* 0.0714 0.2540* 0.2591* -0.1387* 1
13 Education diversity -0.0138 0.0741 0.2004* 0.1442* -0.1545* -0.0256 0.0757 0.1682* -0.0095 -0.0064 0.0207 0.0117 1
14 Capital 0.1798* -0.2065* 0.0297 -0.0292 0.2295* -0.0735 0.1680* -0.0479 0.2871* -0.1506* -0.0755 0.0343 -0.1478* 1
15 Loan -0.002 -0.1577* 0.1442* 0.1585* -0.1266* -0.3013* 0.2381* 0.1471* 0.3577* 0.0705 -0.1272* 0.3296* 0.0592 0.0032 1
16 Foreign bank -0.1342* -0.1475* -0.0567 -0.1175* 0.0474 0.1022* -0.1418* -0.0990* -0.1123* 0.1985* 0.4192* 0.0824 0.0867* -0.0870* 0.0976* 1
17 Listed -0.1390* -0.0539 -0.0241 0.042 -0.1085* -0.1343* 0.0619 0.038 0.1077* 0.1691* 0.3136* 0.1244* -0.0279 -0.0521 -0.0455 -0.0343 1
18 Business group -0.1795* -0.2727* 0.0103 -0.0311 -0.1167* -0.1706* 0.0928* 0.0263 0.2243* 0.1718* 0.0242 0.1670* 0.0942* 0.044 0.0174 0.0011 0.3649* 1
19 Size 0.1368* 0.3061* 0.0872* 0.1436* -0.1220* 0.0131 0.0976* 0.1905* -0.1050* -0.0771 0.2780* -0.0675 -0.018 -0.0991* -0.1789* 0.006 0.4011* -0.2468* 1
20 Crisis -0.0803 -0.0801 0.0517 0.0962* -0.1121* -0.1426* 0.0686 0.0299 0.1162* 0.0303 0.0104 0.0265 -0.0591 -0.031 0.1237* 0.0271 0.0667 0.0108 0.0715  
Note: * represents the significance at the 10% level or smaller. ROA is profits before taxes divided by average assets. ROE is profits before taxes divided by average equity. adjusted 
ROA (adjusted ROE) is the ratio of ROA (ROE) to its standard deviation calculated on last three year observation for the respective year. SDROA = the standard deviation of return 
on average assets based on three previous years data, SDROE = standard deviation of return on equity based on three previous years data, Z-score = (ROA+Equity-to-
Assets)/SDROA, Z-score1=ROA divided by SDROA, Z-score2= Equity-to-total assets divided by SDROA. Female is the percentage of female on the board. Ehtnog diversity is the 
average diversity index of ethnicity and nationality. Professional diversity is the average index of banking experience and tenure diversity. Education diversity is the average diversity 
index of education level and education type. Size is the logarithm of the bank’s total assets. Capital is the ratio of bank’s equity to its assets.  Loan is the ratio of total loans to total 
assets. Foreign bank is a dummy equals one if the bank is owned by foreign shareholders, zero otherwise. Listed equals one if the bank is publicly listed, zero otherwise. Crisis 
denotes one for year 2008 and zero otherwise. 
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Table 4 The impact of board diversity on bank performance: IV/2SLS models 
Dependent var.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Female -0.0206 1.087**                 -17.41 -18.42                
(-0.74) (1.96)                 (-1.28) (-1.62)                
Ethnog diversity -0.0265*** -0.102**                 -2.261** -8.302**                
(-3.08) (-2.41)                 (-2.19) (-2.00)                
Professional div. 0.00841*** 0.0274*                  5.155*** 2.200**                
(3.22)   (1.66)                   (3.05) (2.53)                  
Education div 0.0339** 0.573** 7.520*  8.397*  
(2.29) (2.32)   (1.66)   (1.83)   
Size -0.00180* -0.000895 -0.00228   0.00168 -0.0199 -0.0114 -0.0168   0.0376   1.173** 0.798 0.776 1.878*** 0.985* 1.544* 0.594   1.514** 
(-1.66) (-0.41) (-1.42)   (0.93) (-1.40) (-1.06) (-1.45)   (1.36)   (2.10) (1.64) (0.99) (3.33)   (1.89) (1.78) (1.16)   (2.39)   
Capital 0.0222** 0.0801*** 0.0320** 0.0521*** -0.0642 -0.0292 -0.199** 0.0728   11.85** 12.85** 13.91** 12.34*  -5.441 6.243 -2.486   -0.458   
(2.16) (2.95) (2.43)   (3.20) (-0.83) (-0.27) (-2.08)   (0.35)   (2.18) (2.42) (2.38) (1.96)   (-1.18) (0.88) (-0.63)   (-0.08)   
Loan 0.000611 0.00219 -0.0211** -0.00858 -0.272** -0.111* -0.208*** -0.246** 6.024* 5.259* -1.336 1.846   4.603 2.183 -0.0824   -0.171   
(0.08) (0.20) (-2.16)   (-0.93) (-2.47) (-1.79) (-3.18)   (-1.97)   (1.70) (1.80) (-0.29) (0.64)   (1.46) (0.59) (-0.03)   (-0.05)   
Foreign bank -0.00350 0.0101* -0.000914   0.00807 0.0377 0.0330 -0.0385** 0.164*  -5.496*** -2.376 -4.630** -1.929   -4.769*** -0.220 -4.305*** -2.187   
(-1.41) (1.86) (-0.25)   (1.27) (0.77) (1.11) (-1.99)   (1.66)   (-2.94) (-1.26) (-2.02) (-1.06)   (-3.20) (-0.09) (-3.08)   (-1.26)   
Listed 0.00213 0.0109** -0.00228   -0.000713 -0.0246 0.000226 -0.0184   -0.0587*  -1.615 -0.962 -1.553 -1.243   2.246** 4.528** 2.359** 2.187*  
(1.15) (2.43) (-1.14)   (-0.30) (-1.00) (0.01) (-1.38)   (-1.93)   (-1.07) (-0.61) (-0.84) (-0.91)   (2.49) (2.53) (2.35)   (1.89)   
Group business 0.00975** 0.0328*** 0.00432   0.0236*** 0.176** 0.0926* -0.00736   0.197** -2.154 -1.691 -0.546 4.605*** 2.321 -7.095 1.046   4.010   
(2.01) (3.75) (1.05)   (4.20) (2.06) (1.80) (-0.18)   (2.41)   (-1.04) (-0.66) (-0.21) (2.87)   (1.17) (-0.77) (0.52)   (1.57)   
Crisis period -0.00227** -0.00414** -0.00482   -0.000158 -0.0261* -0.0277** -0.0278   0.0157   0.524 0.325 0.293 1.111   1.010 0.452 0.820   1.622*  
(-2.26) (-2.03) (-1.38)   (-0.10) (-1.74) (-2.13) (-1.12)   (0.65)   (0.63) (0.37) (0.22) (1.21)   (1.13) (0.45) (0.91)   (1.75)   
No. obs. 335 334 344   326 351 332 329 329   346 344 363 369 379 349 365 369   
F-stat 5.23*** 2.33** 3.84*** 4.21*** 2.267*** 3.79*** 5.17*** 1.90* 2.63*** 3.06*** 2.82***  3.59*** 4.69*** 2.56*** 4.62*** 3.55***
Endog.test, Chi-sq:  0.109 10.471*** 6.676*** 7.471*** 0.093 5.076** 3.560* 14.086*** 2.558 4.237** 8.578*** 0.198 4.071** 4.067** 3.003* 5.314**
adjusted ROEReturn on assets (ROA) Return on Equity (ROE) adjusted ROA
Note: The table above reports IV/2SLS regression using ROA, ROE, adjusted ROA and adjusted ROE as the dependent 
variables. Superscripts *, **, *** represent the significance at p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01 respectively. t-statistics shown in 
parentheses are corrected for White heteroskedasticity. ROA is profits before taxes divided by average assets. ROE is profits 
before taxes divided by average equity. Adjusted ROA (adjusted ROE) is the ratio of ROA (ROE) to its standard deviation. 
Female is the percentage of female on the board. Ehtnog diversity is the average diversity index of ethnicity and nationality. 
Professional diversity is the average index of banking experience and tenure diversity. Education diversity is the average 
diversity index of education level and education type. Size is the logarithm of the bank’s total assets. Capital is the ratio of 
bank’s equity to its assets.  Loan is the ratio of total loans to total assets. Foreign bank is a dummy equals one if the bank is 
owned by foreign shareholders, zero otherwise. Listed equals one if the bank is publicly listed, zero otherwise. Crisis denotes 
one for year 2008 and zero otherwise. See Appendix A for detailed descriptions. 
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Table 5 The impact of board diversity on bank risk: IV/2SLS models 
Dependent var.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)   
Female -7.022*** -1.458*                1.020 3.175 1.079                
(-2.64) (-1.74)                (0.38) (1.07) (0.41)                
Ethnog diversity 1.043** 0.986**                -1.638*** -2.398*** -1.135**                
(2.19) (2.02)                (-3.00) (-3.36) (-2.09)                
Professional div. -0.399*** -0.435***                0.854*** 0.873*** 0.496***                
(-2.82) (-2.77)                (4.07) (4.26) (2.73)                
Education div 2.055* 2.251*  -0.199 1.450 -3.574*  
(1.76) (1.87)   (-0.23) (1.27) (-1.91)   
Size -0.293*** -0.416*** -0.342*** -0.162 -0.256*** -0.330** -0.303*** -0.100   0.216*** 0.343** 0.314** 0.232* 0.241** 0.361* 0.260* 0.374** 0.282*** 0.352** 0.315*** -0.0291   
(-2.87) (-3.51) (-3.50) (-1.30) (-2.71) (-2.38) (-2.97) (-0.62)   (2.61) (2.15) (2.26) (1.89) (2.50) (1.80) (1.85) (2.35) (2.98) (2.21) (2.74) (-0.13)   
Capital -0.556 -2.872* -0.958 0.513 -0.159 -2.070 -0.836 0.521   0.831 4.248** 1.599 0.995 1.359 6.694*** 2.544* 2.901* 2.640** 4.637*** 2.815** 0.671   
(-0.52) (-1.70) (-0.85) (0.45) (-0.17) (-1.44) (-0.82) (0.48)   (0.95) (2.40) (1.35) (1.03) (1.28) (2.81) (1.92) (1.89) (2.36) (2.82) (2.45) (0.49)   
Loan 0.170 -0.760 -0.215 -1.223* -1.139** -1.498*** -0.716 -1.714** 0.738 1.015 -0.441 0.904* 0.0331 1.200 -0.677 0.00249 1.584** 1.923*** 0.985 2.355** 
(0.25) (-1.35) (-0.37) (-1.87) (-2.16) (-2.66) (-1.07) (-2.42)   (1.19) (1.50) (-0.55) (1.65) (0.05) (1.33) (-0.84) (0.00) (2.10) (2.99) (1.33) (2.49)   
Foreign bank -0.00450 -0.125 0.500** 1.068** 0.470** 0.0488 0.668*** 1.257*** -0.488* 0.171 -0.876** -0.638* -0.534 0.437 -0.964*** -0.199 -0.361 0.0985 -0.608*** -1.590** 
(-0.01) (-0.40) (1.97) (2.27) (2.43) (0.17) (2.81) (2.63)   (-1.89) (0.49) (-2.47) (-1.70) (-1.64) (0.92) (-2.63) (-0.39) (-1.43) (0.31) (-2.64) (-2.25)   
Listed 0.243 -0.0343 0.424* 0.177 -0.467*** -0.741*** -0.296 -0.559*** 0.168 0.715** -0.155 0.189 -0.108 0.623 -0.470 -0.151 0.608*** 0.989*** 0.478** 0.842***
(1.08) (-0.13) (1.86) (0.73) (-2.74) (-2.67) (-1.59) (-2.87)   (1.02) (2.39) (-0.59) (1.09) (-0.49) (1.48) (-1.45) (-0.59) (3.20) (3.25) (2.28) (3.52)   
Group business -0.555 -0.389 0.890*** 1.082*** -0.522 -0.537 0.698*** 0.870** 0.267 1.351*** -0.915*** 0.0640 0.544 1.864*** -0.924*** 0.642 0.302 0.972** -0.454* -0.963   
(-1.37) (-0.91) (4.00) (2.67) (-1.33) (-1.34) (3.29) (2.12)   (0.69) (2.70) (-2.83) (0.21) (1.26) (2.76) (-2.69) (1.63) (0.80) (2.14) (-1.88) (-1.57)   
Crisis period -0.158 -0.0829 -0.123 -0.0418 -0.217** -0.168 -0.181 -0.0627   0.101 0.0239 0.0937 0.0885 -0.0302 -0.185 -0.0409 0.0758 0.182 0.147 0.166 -0.0388   
(-1.25) (-0.61) (-0.91) (-0.29) (-2.15) (-1.38) (-1.46) (-0.43)   (0.90) (0.15) (0.50) (0.70) (-0.21) (-0.84) (-0.18) (0.47) (1.58) (1.06) (1.19) (-0.20)   
No. obs. 357 341 337 348 356 353 334 336  354 352 345 338 344 343 336 328 343 352 334 336   
F-stat 2.551*** 3.010*** 3.737*** 2.933*** 7.704*** 6.799*** 7.035*** 6.1020*** 5.141*** 3.646*** 4.515*** 5.395*** 2.242*** 2.645*** 3.707*** 1.629*** 8.605*** 9.307*** 11.61*** 5.696  ***
Endog. test 2.532 7.500*** 9.587*** 3.662* 0.826 0.097 4.136** 4.267** 0.9325 6.462** 14.391*** 0.001 1.005 18.081*** 24.243*** 2.471 1.634 0.662 4.285** 6.400**
SDROA) SDROE Z-score Z-score1 Z-score2
 Note: The table above reports IV/2SLS regression using SDROA, SDROE, Z-score, Z-score 1, and Z-score 2 as the dependent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** represent the 
significance at p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01 respectively. t-statistics shown in parentheses are corrected for White heteroskedasticity. SDROA (SDROE) is the standard deviation of 
ROA (ROE) calculated on last three year observation for the respective year.  Z-score = (ROA+Equity-to-Assets)/SDROA, Z-score1=ROA divided by SDROA, Z-score2= Equity-
to-total assets divided by SDROA. The values of dependent variables are in natural logarithm. Female is the percentage of female on the board. Ehtnog diversity is the average 
diversity index of ethnicity and nationality. Professional diversity is the average index of banking experience and tenure diversity. Education diversity is the average diversity index 
of education level and education type. Size is the logarithm of the bank’s total assets. Capital is the ratio of bank equity to its assets.  Loan is the ratio of total loans to total assets. 
Foreign bank is a dummy equals one if the bank is owned by foreign shareholders, zero otherwise. Listed equals one if the bank is publicly listed, zero otherwise. Crisis denotes one 
for year 2008 and zero otherwise. See Appendix A for detailed descriptions. 
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Table 6 The impact of board diversity on bank performance: IV/2SLS models on individual diversity dimensions 
Dependent var.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
Female -0.0206                1.087**                -17.41                -18.42
(-0.74)                (1.96)                (-1.28)                (-1.62)
-0.0534**                -0.608***                -8.666*                -9.510**
(-2.31)                (-2.99)                (-1.65)                (-2.15)
-0.00519*                -0.0688***                -1.136**                -1.121**
(-1.84)                (-3.13)                (-2.26)                (-2.42)
0.00434***                0.0214**                3.488***                0.568**
(2.61)                (1.96)                (3.14)                (2.42)
0.0122**                0.118**                1.283**                5.170**
(2.52)                (2.44)                (2.03)                (2.05)
0.0321*                0.255**                5.779*                3.538*
(1.80)                (2.47)                (1.93)                (1.67)
0.0483*  0.955*** 22.48*  36.26*
(1.69)   (3.14)   (1.96)   (1.88)
Size -0.00180* -0.000254 -0.00150 0.00121 -0.0102*** 0.00298 0.000960   -0.0199 0.0227 -0.00239 0.00683 -0.0873** 0.0315 0.0443** 1.173** 1.036** 0.752 2.769*** -0.0505 1.915*** 2.286*** 0.985* 0.913* 0.444 0.831 -2.913* 1.300** 2.477*
(-1.66) (-0.19) (-1.14) (0.74) (-2.85) (1.13) (0.41)   (-1.40) (1.20) (-0.21) (0.44) (-2.29) (1.24) (2.03)   (2.10) (2.16) (1.53) (2.88) (-0.08) (3.14) (3.01)   (1.89) (1.76) (0.81) (1.61) (-1.78) (2.27) (1.84)
Capital 0.0222** 0.0495*** 0.0204** 0.0267*** 0.0155** 0.0197 0.0259*** -0.0642 0.0823 -0.0141 -0.0360 -0.0818 -0.0447 0.127   11.85** 13.41** 12.15** 20.41*** 9.109* 11.35* 17.71** -5.441 0.931 -1.562 -2.947 -2.588 -2.463 11.18
(2.16) (3.27) (2.53) (3.59) (2.41) (1.24) (2.68)   (-0.83) (1.26) (-0.31) (-0.64) (-1.09) (-0.44) (1.24)   (2.18) (2.38) (2.31) (2.73) (1.83) (1.84) (2.37)   (-1.18) (0.19) (-0.34) (-0.70) (-0.52) (-0.50) (1.18)
Loan 0.000611 -0.00487 -0.0112* -0.0166* -0.0278***-0.0306** -0.0201*  -0.272** -0.112* -0.164** -0.167** -0.313*** -0.284*** -0.318*** 6.024* 6.762** 5.023* -0.611 2.732 1.754 0.489   4.603 4.441 3.604 2.734 -3.565 0.729 -2.217
(0.08) (-0.59) (-1.66) (-1.86) (-2.76) (-1.97) (-1.92)   (-2.47) (-1.66) (-2.29) (-2.55) (-2.76) (-2.59) (-2.85)   (1.70) (2.16) (1.71) (-0.12) (0.93) (0.64) (0.16)   (1.46) (1.57) (1.27) (0.97) (-0.65) (0.23) (-0.41)
Foreign bank -0.00350 0.0234** 0.000423 -0.00604* 0.000260 0.0174 -0.00102   0.0377 0.265** 0.0103 -0.0451* -0.00209 0.129 0.00189   -5.496*** 0.719 -2.949 -6.875** -3.521** -1.553 -2.551   -4.769*** 0.567 -3.461** -4.543*** -3.098 -2.629 -3.197
(-1.41) (1.99) (0.18) (-1.86) (0.07) (1.29) (-0.39)   (0.77) (2.50) (0.41) (-1.68) (-0.05) (1.57) (0.05)   (-2.94) (0.22) (-1.63) (-2.21) (-2.02) (-0.86) (-1.52)   (-3.20) (0.22) (-2.47) (-3.37) (-1.49) (-1.64) (-1.46)
Listed 0.00213 0.00278 0.00500 0.00164 -0.00666 -0.00287 0.00283   -0.0246 -0.0381* 0.00701 -0.0362* -0.119*** -0.0742** -0.0132   -1.615 -1.612 -0.956 -1.338 -2.603 -1.503 -0.169   2.246** 1.927* 3.063*** 2.276** -1.436 2.118* 3.264*
(1.15) (1.01) (1.48) (0.49) (-1.41) (-0.69) (0.95)   (-1.00) (-1.76) (0.34) (-1.79) (-2.64) (-2.41) (-0.41)   (-1.07) (-1.14) (-0.61) (-0.56) (-1.59) (-1.09) (-0.12)   (2.49) (1.90) (2.94) (2.32) (-0.59) (1.88) (1.97)
0.00975** 0.0528*** 0.0173*** 0.00586 0.00754 0.0399*** 0.00586   0.176** 0.454*** 0.0728 -0.0169 -0.0378 0.228*** -0.134*  -2.154 6.660* -2.545 -5.790*** -0.440 5.092*** 3.541   2.321 7.083** -2.907 -0.978 -3.332 3.843 -6.384*
(2.01) (3.08) (4.52) (1.53) (1.26) (2.61) (1.00)   (2.06) (3.09) (1.53) (-0.44) (-0.53) (2.68) (-1.88)   (-1.04) (1.67) (-0.93) (-2.61) (-0.51) (3.11) (1.51)   (1.17) (2.02) (-1.14) (-1.02) (-1.22) (1.57) (-1.83)
Crisis period -0.00227**-0.00256**-0.00278** -0.00233 -0.00198 0.00256 -0.00234*  -0.0261* -0.0268** -0.0296** -0.0241* -0.0207 0.0147 -0.0241   0.524 0.340 0.336 0.476 0.464 1.410 0.500   1.010 0.782 0.746 0.856 0.956 1.539* 0.836
(-2.26) (-2.09) (-2.07) (-1.18) (-1.25) (0.77) (-1.76)   (-1.74) (-2.08) (-2.10) (-1.69) (-1.23) (0.73) (-1.33)   (0.63) (0.41) (0.38) (0.33) (0.54) (1.46) (0.54)   (1.13) (0.94) (0.87) (1.06) (0.94) (1.73) (0.77)
No. obs. 335 339 352 349 348 348 348   351 357 357 351 348 348 350   346 357 344 335 334 370 367   379 353 346 336 333 369 329
F-stat. 5.230*** 5.441*** 3.945*** 4.622*** 3.565*** 2.158*** 3.794   *** 2.267*** 3.774*** 4.271*** 3.342*** 2.776*** 2.202*** 3.342   *** 2.627*** 3.495*** 3.035*** 2.367*** 3.830*** 3.032*** 2.834   *** 4.690*** 3.970*** 4.721*** 4.343*** 2.092*** 3.727*** 1.752***
Endog.test  0.109 12.629***  7.533*** 15.799*** 8.092*** 7.700*** 8.515*** 0.093 4.923** 4.145** 4.132** 7.744*** 9.823*** 4.708** 2.558 0.578 4.894** 21.742*** 3.208* 2.877* 4.972** 4.071** 4.279** 4.519** 1.083 6.353** 4.150** 4.542**
Ethnic diversity
Return on Asset (ROA) Return on Equity (ROE) adjusted ROA adjusted ROE
National diversity
Experience 
diversity
Tenure diveristy
Education level 
diversity
Education type 
diversity
Group business
 
Note: The table above reports IV/2SLS regression using ROA, ROE, adjusted ROA and adjusted ROE as the dependent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** represent the significance at 
p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01 respectively. t-statistics shown in parentheses are corrected for White heteroskedasticity. ROA is profits before taxes divided by average assets. ROE is profits 
before taxes divided by average equity.  Adjusted ROA (adjusted ROE) is the ratio of ROA (ROE) to its standard deviation calculated on last three year observation for the respective year. 
Female is the percentage of female on the board. National and ethnicity diversities are the diversity measures (indices) based on nationality and ethnicity respectively. Experience diversity 
is the diversity index calculated as standard deviation of the years of banking experience. Tenure diversity is the standard deviation of tenure periods of board members. Education level 
diversity is the diversity based on highest education level, whereas education type diversity is the ratio of directors with education other than economics, finance, accounting, and business. 
Size is the logarithm of the bank’s total assets. Capital is the ratio of bank’s equity to its assets.  Loan is the ratio of total loans to total assets. Foreign bank is a dummy equals one if the 
bank is owned by foreign shareholders, zero otherwise. Listed equals one if the bank is publicly listed, zero otherwise. Crisis denotes one for year 2008 and zero otherwise. See Appendix 
A for detailed descriptions. 
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Table 7 The impact of board diversity on bank risk: IV/2SLS models on individual diversity dimensions 
Dependent var.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
Female -7.022***                -1.458*                1.942**                 1.764*                1.458*                
(-2.64)                (-1.74)                (2.21)                 (1.73)                (1.68)                
11.05***                4.274**                -11.71*** -12.82***                -8.406***                
(3.29)                (2.40)                (-3.53) (-3.88)                (-3.02)                
0.660**                0.190**                -0.213** -0.278**                -0.198*                
(2.41)                (2.02)                (-2.19) (-2.15)                (-1.75)                
-0.327***                -0.0974***                0.484*** 0.685***                0.398***                
(-2.74)                (-2.63)                (3.49) (3.61)                (2.86)                
-1.269**                -0.763***                0.251*** 0.238**                1.854***                
(-2.09)                (-3.16)                (2.66) (2.14)                (4.18)                
0.301*                0.470***                -0.323**                 1.794**                -2.494*                
(1.82)                (3.27)                (-2.11)                 (2.30)                (-1.83)                
7.869** 7.869** 3.953*  5.312** -4.597** 
(2.00)   (2.00)   (1.82)   (2.25)   (-2.05)   
Size -0.293*** -0.983*** -0.368*** -0.557*** 0.451 -0.304*** -0.00231   -0.256*** -0.489*** -0.278*** -0.350*** 0.209 -0.225** -0.00231   0.209** 0.988*** 0.243** 0.620*** 0.0812 0.186** 0.518*** 0.203* 0.855*** 0.225* 0.667*** 0.0572 0.558*** 0.621*** 0.248** 0.776*** 0.273** 0.573*** -0.886*** -0.0618 0.0886   
(-2.87) (-3.56) (-2.85) (-4.63) (1.07) (-3.22) (-0.01)   (-2.71) (-3.34) (-2.66) (-3.74) (1.12) (-2.21) (-0.01)   (2.39) (3.33) (2.46) (4.08) (0.69) (2.00) (3.41)   (1.94) (3.09) (1.91) (3.43) (0.40) (2.98) (3.37)   (2.36) (3.26) (2.28) (3.90) (-2.70) (-0.23) (0.57)   
Capital -0.556 -7.625** -2.802* -1.027 -0.581 -0.289 3.014*  -0.159 -2.672* -0.674 -0.335 -0.570 0.0790 3.014*  0.892 8.889*** 1.452 1.623 0.839 0.632 3.096** 0.948 10.47*** 1.813 2.934* 0.915 2.073 3.493** 1.997* 7.641*** 2.545** 2.787** 2.496 0.737 0.436   
(-0.52) (-2.53) (-1.77) (-0.84) (-0.39) (-0.28) (1.72)   (-0.17) (-1.66) (-0.71) (-0.35) (-0.62) (0.08) (1.72)   (1.01) (2.84) (1.55) (1.24) (0.99) (0.73) (2.17)   (0.86) (3.34) (1.44) (1.84) (0.81) (1.27) (2.11)   (1.85) (2.85) (2.41) (2.03) (1.64) (0.46) (0.31)   
Loan 0.170 -2.413* -0.764 -0.281 1.278 -0.803 -2.166** -1.139** -2.102*** -1.396*** -1.259** -0.302 -1.490*** -2.166** 0.800 2.554** 1.109** 0.131 0.641 1.209** 0.537   0.726 2.634** 1.173* -0.321 0.686 0.471 0.373   1.537** 2.773*** 1.789*** 1.118 -1.055 2.614** 2.511***
(0.25) (-1.92) (-1.25) (-0.45) (1.00) (-1.60) (-2.03)   (-2.16) (-3.04) (-2.82) (-2.45) (-0.40) (-2.84) (-2.03)   (1.63) (2.07) (2.23) (0.17) (1.28) (2.42) (0.80)   (1.10) (2.01) (1.67) (-0.32) (0.98) (0.50) (0.44)   (2.51) (2.73) (3.13) (1.39) (-0.85) (2.38) (3.10)   
Foreign bank -0.00450 -4.717*** 0.0782 0.683** 0.182 0.609** 0.694*  0.470** -1.624* 0.417** 0.627*** 0.396 0.832*** 0.694*  -0.402* 4.785*** -0.364 -0.991*** -0.460* -0.680** -0.419*  -0.284 5.251*** -0.190 -1.186** -0.329 0.236 -0.188   -0.356* 3.512** -0.299 -0.780*** -0.0971 -1.986** -0.614** 
(-0.01) (-2.81) (0.29) (2.31) (0.48) (2.41) (1.70)   (2.43) (-1.73) (2.05) (3.38) (1.51) (3.60) (1.70)   (-1.72) (2.92) (-1.46) (-2.75) (-1.96) (-2.51) (-1.72)   (-0.73) (3.11) (-0.48) (-2.46) (-0.85) (0.44) (-0.47)   (-1.75) (2.57) (-1.38) (-2.78) (-0.21) (-2.07) (-2.00)   
Listed 0.243 0.291 -0.190 0.235 1.166* 0.190 0.496   -0.467*** -0.409** -0.565*** -0.435** 0.115 -0.503*** 0.496   0.207 0.0403 0.309* 0.156 -0.00321 0.227 0.555** -0.147 -0.0572 -0.00162 -0.0890 -0.333 -0.146 0.197   0.671*** 0.534** 0.771*** 0.621** -0.717 1.011*** 0.490** 
(1.08) (0.83) (-0.62) (0.84) (1.94) (0.83) (1.46)   (-2.74) (-2.05) (-3.22) (-2.53) (0.44) (-2.98) (1.46)   (1.28) (0.12) (1.79) (0.54) (-0.02) (1.37) (2.27)   (-0.66) (-0.16) (-0.01) (-0.22) (-1.36) (-0.49) (0.68)   (3.60) (2.00) (4.15) (2.39) (-1.44) (2.98) (2.05)   
Group business -0.555 -7.373*** -0.115 1.026*** 1.073* 0.658*** -0.724   -0.522 -3.618*** 0.0383 -0.280 0.588* 0.569*** -0.724   0.420*** 8.380*** -0.225 -0.801*** 0.171 0.0998 1.520*** 0.278 9.233*** -0.544 -1.142*** 0.0307 2.518*** 2.056** 0.808** 6.101*** 0.228 -0.617** -0.835 -1.861* 0.821** 
(-1.37) (-3.07) (-0.35) (4.19) (1.72) (3.66) (-1.07)   (-1.33) (-2.58) (0.13) (-0.56) (1.90) (3.29) (-1.07)   (2.69) (3.54) (-0.55) (-2.82) (0.79) (0.38) (2.66)   (1.57) (3.87) (-0.92) (-2.97) (0.14) (3.41) (2.17)   (2.09) (3.02) (0.64) (-2.07) (-1.16) (-1.70) (2.00)   
Crisis period -0.158 -0.0958 -0.120 -0.164 -0.217 -0.131 -0.187   -0.217** -0.180 -0.197* -0.208** -0.231* -0.158 -0.187   0.0987 0.0255 0.0746 0.0792 0.100 0.0464 0.120   -0.0430 -0.124 -0.0764 -0.0738 -0.0485 0.235 -0.0450   0.203* 0.135 0.181 0.190 0.252 -0.142 0.218*  
(-1.25) (-0.48) (-0.84) (-1.05) (-1.20) (-1.13) (-1.07)   (-2.15) (-1.56) (-1.86) (-2.02) (-1.85) (-1.54) (-1.07)   (0.87) (0.13) (0.62) (0.41) (0.86) (0.39) (0.88)   (-0.30) (-0.55) (-0.49) (-0.26) (-0.33) (1.12) (-0.27)   (1.81) (0.82) (1.54) (1.15) (1.20) (-0.53) (1.71)   
No. obs. 357 363 351 344 345 343 350   356 352 352 345 345 343 350   355 360 351 346 341 344 373   345 346 343 337 334 367 364   356 354 352 346 345 348 347   
F-stat. 2.551*** 2.726*** 3.873*** 2.078*** 4.134*** 2.338   *** 8.025*** 7.704*** 15.11*** 8.157*** 6.260*** 9.235*** 2.338 *** 9.526*** 2.892*** 5.217*** 4.673*** 6.240*** 4.884*** 5.910  *** 5.564*** 2.763*** 2.699*** 2.847*** 3.383*** 3.564*** 3.787 *** 9.091*** 5.701*** 20.33*** 6.789*** 4.559*** 4.390*** 8.259  *** ***
Endog. test 2.532  11.481*** 8.955*** 11.636*** 10.261*** 0.810 17.195*** 0.826 7.024*** 2.717* 1.435 8.552*** 0.811 4.446** 4.156** 18.463*** 6.096** 12.513*** 4.353** 0.743 0.951 1.346 27.666*** 5.030** 24.071*** 3.762** 7.154*** 3.470* 0.2837 9.474*** 3.088*  8.449*** 22.830*** 6.83*** 2.304
SDROA SDROE Z-score Z-score 1 Z-score 2
Experience diversity
Tenure diversity
Education level 
diversity
Education type 
diversity
National diversity
Ethnic diversity
Note: The table above reports IV/2SLS regression using SDROA, SDROE, Z-score, Z-score 1, and Z-score 2 as the dependent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** represent the significance 
at p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01 respectively. t-statistics shown in parentheses are corrected for White heteroskedasticity. SDROA (SDROE) is the standard deviation of ROA (ROE) 
calculated on last three year observation for the respective year.  Z-score = (ROA+Equity-to-Assets)/SDROA, Z-score1=ROA divided by SDROA, Z-score2= Equity-to-total assets 
divided by SDROA. The values of dependent variables are in natural logarithm. Female is the percentage of female on the board. National and ethnicity diversities are the diversity 
measures (indices) based on nationality and ethnicity respectively. Experience diversity is the diversity index calculated as standard deviation of the years of banking experience. Tenure 
diversity is the standard deviation of tenure periods of board members. Education level diversity is the diversity based on highest education level, whereas education type diversity is the 
ratio of directors with education other than economics, finance, accounting, and business. Size is the logarithm of the bank’s total assets. Capital is the ratio of bank’s equity to its assets.  
Loan is the ratio of total loans to total assets. Foreign bank is a dummy equals one if the bank is owned by foreign shareholders, zero otherwise. Listed equals one if the bank is publicly 
listed, zero otherwise. Crisis denotes one for year 2008 and zero otherwise. See Appendix A for detailed descriptions. 
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Table 8 The impact of board diversity on bank performance: Alternative performance measures 
Dependent var.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.0281*                -1.088**                
(1.77)                (-2.29)                
Ethnog diversity 0.00371                0.176***                
(1.11)                (3.06)                
Professional diversity 0.0281***                -0.0944***                
(3.21)                (-3.93)                
Education diversity 0.0376** -0.585***
(2.15)   (-3.05)   
Size -0.00241 -0.00324* -0.00313 0.00184   -0.00782 -0.0255 -0.00254 -0.0719***
(-1.37) (-1.74) (-0.82) (0.65)   (-0.60) (-1.62) (-0.16) (-2.89)   
Capital -0.0154* -0.0206** 0.0178 -0.00678   -0.230*** -0.300*** -0.252*** -0.284   
(-1.95) (-2.36) (1.03) (-0.50)   (-3.19) (-2.66) (-3.26) (-1.61)   
Loan 0.0211* 0.0272** -0.00782 0.00262   0.119 0.0775 0.148* 0.264** 
(1.92) (2.36) (-0.38) (0.18)   (1.39) (1.04) (1.95) (2.12)   
Foreign bank 0.00799* 0.00482 -0.000949 0.0160** -0.0277 -0.0622 0.0424 -0.162*  
(1.92) (1.05) (-0.10) (2.09)   (-0.76) (-1.61) (1.27) (-1.73)   
Listed -0.0000488 -0.000913 -0.0124* -0.00230   -0.0308 -0.0750** 0.00381 0.0150   
(-0.01) (-0.25) (-1.68) (-0.56)   (-1.23) (-2.26) (0.13) (0.48)   
Business group 0.0240*** 0.0272*** -0.00855 0.0435*** -0.173** -0.253*** 0.0268 -0.313***
(3.38) (4.64) (-0.72) (5.99)   (-2.30) (-4.04) (0.58) (-3.89)   
Crisis period -0.000204 -0.0000708 -0.000757 0.00282   0.0258* 0.0280* 0.0207 -0.0231   
(-0.14) (-0.05) (-0.16) (1.28)   (1.79) (1.88) (1.05) (-0.97)   
N 352 348 348 349   389 355 348 350   
F-stat 4.18*** 6.25*** 3.50*** 10.12*** 2.40** 2.81*** 3.17*** 2.49**
Endog. Test (Chi-sq) 12.92*** 13.77*** 6.95*** 7.33*** 2.72*** 9.44*** 7.00*** 9.13***
NIM OEOI
  
Note: The table above reports IV/2SLS regression using net interest margin (NIM) and the ratio of operating expense-to-
operating income (OEOI) as the dependent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** represent the significance at p<0.1, p<0.05, 
and p<0.01 respectively. t-statistics shown in parentheses are corrected for White heteroskedasticity. NIM is defined as net 
interest income divided by average of earning assets. OEOI is the ratio of operating expenses divided by operating 
incomes. Female is the percentage of female on the board. Ehtnog diversity is the average diversity index of ethnicity and 
nationality. Professional diversity is the average index of banking experience and tenure diversity. Education diversity is 
the average diversity index of education level and education type. Size is the logarithm of the bank’s total assets. Capital is 
the ratio of bank’s equity to its assets.  Loan is the ratio of total loans to total assets. Foreign bank is a dummy equals one if 
the bank is owned by foreign shareholders, zero otherwise. Listed equals one if the bank is publicly listed, zero otherwise. 
Crisis denotes one for year 2008 and zero otherwise. 
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Appendix A Definition of variables 
Variable Definition Source
Panel A. Performance and risk measures
ROA Profits before taxes divided by average assets Annual reports
ROE Profits before taxes divided by average equity Annual reports
adjusted ROA
The ratio of ROA to its standard deviation calculated from the 
last three observations for the respective year
Annual reports
adjusted ROE
Tthe ratio of ROE to its standard deviation calculated from the 
last three observations for the respective year
Annual reports
SDROA
Standard deviation of last three-year returns on average assets 
(i.e., t, t-1  and t-2 )
Annual reports
SDROE
Standard deviation of last three-year return on average equity 
(i.e., t, t-1  and t-2 )
Annual reports
Z-score
Return on average assets (ROA) plus equity to total assets ratio, 
divided by the standard deviation of last three-year ROA
Annual reports
Z-score 1
Return on average assets (ROA) divided by the standard deviation 
of last three-year ROA
Annual reports
Z-score 2
Equity to total assets ratio, divided by the standard deviation of 
last three-year ROA
Annual reports
Panel B. Diversity (Heterogeneity) measures
1. Female
The ratio of female on the board, that is the number of female 
divided by total number of directors 
Annual reports, News 
releases, Bank's website
2. Ethnog diveristy Ethnog diveristy = (Ethnic diversity + nationality diversity)/2
     # Ethnic diversity The Blau’s index (inversed HHI) based on the ethnicity
Annual reports, News 
releases, Bank's website
     # Nationality diversity
The Blau’s index (inversed HHI) based on the nationality, ranging 
from 0 (no diversity) to 0.5 (the number of local is the same as 
that of foreign directors). 
Annual reports, News 
releases, Bank's website
3. Professional diversity
Professional diversity = (Tenure diversity + Experience 
diversity)/2. 
     # Experience diversity
The standard deviation of the number of years of banking 
experience 
Annual reports, News 
releases, Bank's website, 
Indonesia Banking Institute
     # Tenure diversity
The standard deviation of the number of years (tenure) the person 
serving the directorship
Annual reports, News 
releases, Bank's website, 
Indonesia Banking Institute
4. Education diveristy
The average of education level and education type diversities. 
Education diversity = (education level diversity + education level 
diversity)/2
    # Education level 
diversity
The Blau’s index based on the highest education degree of 
directors: 1) no bachelor degree (S0), 2) bachelor degree (S1), 
3) master degree (S2), and 4) doctoral degree or beyond (S3)
Annual report, News 
releases, Bank's website
    # Education type 
diversity
The number of board members with education background other 
than economics, finance, accounting, and business divided by 
total board members
Annual report, News 
releases, Bank's website
Panel C. Control variables
Size The logarithm of total assets Annual reports
Capital Total equity divided by total assets Annual reports
Loan Total loan divided by total assets Annual reports
Foreign bank
Dummy takes one if the bank is owned by foreign investors, zero 
otherwise
Annual reports
Listed Dummy takes one if the bank is publicly listed, zero otherwise Annual reports
Business group
Dummy takes one if the bank is a member of a business group , 
zero otherwise
Annual reports,  Bank's 
website
Crisis Dummy takes one for year 2008, zero otherwise
Annual reports, Central 
Bank of Indonesia  
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